This paper examines incentive-wage effects for production and for managerial/technical workers in both urban and rural Chinese non-agricultural enterprises. We report strong evidence of productivity-enhancing wage behavior among enterprises in all ownership categories. There is also evidence that firms paying higher efficiency wages experience less shirking among their employees. We find that the profit-maximizing potential of incentive-wage setting is not fully exploited, although there is weak evidence that joint ventures come closer to profit-maximizing behavior at this intensive margin of wage/employment behavior than do collectives or state-owned enterprises.
Introduction and Literature Review
This paper is an empirical investigation of the efficiency-wage effect in Chinese labor markets. The market reforms that began in agriculture in the late 1970s spread unevenly and gradually to both rural and urban industrial enterprises and opened the door to profit-seeking behavior in product and input markets. State-owned, collective, and privately owned firms have come under increasing competitive pressure to reduce costs, of which labor costs are among the most important. In the absence of costless information and in the presence of costly monitoring, indirect means of controlling labor costs and reducing shirking are required. Efficiency-wage payments are recognized as an important means of achieving these goals.
The idea that higher real wages can lead to greater productivity and even to higher profits is found in the writings of economists as far back as Adam Smith. The emergence of efficiency-wage theory in the 1970s was a response to the persistence of several phenomena that are inconsistent with neoclassical economic theory, including involuntary unemployment, wage differences not explained by the theory of competitive labor markets or models of human capital, and wage rigidity in the presence of cyclical unemployment. Presentations of the relevant models and citations to the literature are found 3 in Stiglitz (1986) and Katz (1986) . Akerlof and Yellen (1986) contains reprints of a number of classic articles on efficiency-wage models and presents a succinct introduction summarizing alternative underlying rationales for efficiency-wage schemes.
We study the incentive effects of wages in Chinese enterprises in both rural and urban areas under various ownership arrangements. The uneven transition toward free markets in China involved different policies and enforcement in urban versus rural areas, stateowned versus collective-and privately-owned enterprises, and to special economic zones versus non-favored areas. Hence, we expect to observe different manifestations of market forces, including the application and effects of efficiency-wage policies, across firms. We assume that workers are living above subsistence levels, so that productivity enhancement does not operate primarily by making workers stronger and healthier (Leibenstein, 1986 ), but rather through enhanced incentives. We do not distinguish between wage policies in which bonuses or other forms of sharing are implicitly or explicitly linked to the firms' profits (e.g., Weitzman, 1984) , and those in which firms act up-front to pay workers higher than competitive-market wages in order to increase incentives to reduce quits, absenteeism, or shirking. Our major question is whether any policies that raise pay above a worker's alternative wage increase incentives and thus contribute to higher productivity and/or profit. Empirical studies of efficiency wages in non-agricultural firms have generally used data from major industrial countries. Frequently these studies have focused on intermediate targets of wage policy, e.g. turnover or worker morale, rather than on the bottom line of profits or productivity. In a widely cited study, Krueger and Summers (1988) report evidence that industry wage differentials that are uncorrelated with observable human capital characteristics in the United States are negatively related to worker turnover. Cahuc and Dormont (1997) use two panels of French manufacturing firms with observations from 1986 to 1989 to show a positive relationship between various profit-sharing arrangements and productivity at the micro level. Huang, Hallam, Orazem, and Paterno (1998) summarize research published in the 1990s that shows a negative relationship between relative wages and disciplinary layoffs; a positive effect on firm sales; and a positive effect on firm output. In their own research using United States data at the two-digit industry level, these authors find that wage premia that are unexplained by observable human capital characteristics and unemployment rates are positively related to productivity.
We are not aware of research on China that looks explicitly for efficiency-wage effects on worker behavior, productivity, or profits. However, there is a considerable body of research that explores the relationship between wage-payment schemes and productivity. 
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In a recent paper, Zhuang and Xu (1996) show that the positive relationship between bonus payments and total-factor-productivity (TFP) growth in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reported by Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton (1994) can be replicated in data that extends into the early 1990s. Moreover, they show that bonus incentives increase profits as well as productivity. Coady and Wang (2000a) establish evidence of a positive relationship between wage bonuses and profits in urban Liaoning province; however, they do not find direct evidence that bonus-sharing creates stronger work incentives. Dong and Putterman (2000) report a similar result for a sample of 1000 SOEs over the decade 1980 to 1990. Both papers conclude that bonus payments are underused because, if their results were produced by processes in which increased bonuses cause higher productivity, increases in bonus payments would increase profits in their samples of enterprises. Yuen (2000) finds that enterprises perform better financially if employees' wage payments are closely related to their output.
In this paper, we depart from previous studies of the Chinese economy in three ways.
First, rather than focusing on the behavior of bonus payments, we estimate an efficiencywage component of the reported wage payments indirectly and then estimate the impact of these excess wage payments on productivity. We also use data on reported shirking to show a negative relationship between our measure of efficiency wages and shirking in 6 one sample of data. Second, we divide enterprises' employees into skilled and unskilled workers and examine the incentive effects of wage payments separately for each group.
Third, we exploit the panel feature of our sample of rural enterprises to address the issue of Granger causality between productivity and efficiency wage payments.
We find considerable support for the hypothesis that Chinese firms pay wages that have positive incentive effects. However, the degree to which this tool of cost-minimization is exploited varies widely across ownership types and between rural and urban areas. We confirm Zhuang and Xu's (1996) and Dong and Putterman's (2000) finding that urban enterprises underuse efficiency-wage payments from a profit-maximization perspective.
However, we find that, among rural enterprises, efficiency-wage payments are higher than profit maximization would require.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe briefly wage policies in China during the period studied; we then specify a simple efficiencywage model of production; finally, we discuss the two data sets (urban and rural) used in our empirical work. In section 3, we present estimation results for the urban sample; section 4 contains the estimation results for the rural sample. Section 5 concludes. 7 2 Enterprise Wage Policies, Efficiency Wages and
Productivity, and the Data
Under central planning, particularly in SOEs, wages were set according to a wage grid that categorized workers into eight skill classes. Wage differentials were highly compressed; see, for example, Gordon and Li (1999) . Bonus payments, which were deemed unacceptable during the Cultural Revolution, reappeared in the late 1970s as economic reform began. According to Naughton (1995) , the share of bonus payments in total wage packages increased steadily from virtually nothing in 1978 to approximately 22% in 1992. He reports that enterprise managers were given more autonomy in hiring and wage decisions and encouraged to use bonus payment to improve workers' incentive and thus productivity. Meng and Perkins (1998) confirm that both state and nonstate enterprises acquired more wage-setting autonomy with economic reform. Coady and Wang (2000b) note that, by the late 1980s, bonus payments were contributing to increased earnings inequality in both the state and collective sectors. Gordon and Li (1999) provide evidence that wage compression among SOEs subjected them to increasing labor-market competition from the non-state sector as economic reform progressed in the 1980s. New ownership forms were not required to follow 8 the traditional wage grid, although they were not totally free of political pressure in setting rates of pay. Thus, fast-growing collective and private enterprises became relatively attractive employers, particularly to underpaid managerial and technical workers. While there is evidence that wage differentials by level of schooling have increased during the late 1980s and early 1990s (Li, 2001) , substantial wage compression remained among all ownership forms.
Efficiency Wages in the Production Function
We postulate a simple efficiency-wage model following Stiglitz (1986) , Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Krueger and Summers (1988) in which the excess of wages paid over an estimate of a spot-market competitive wage is included as a regressor in the following augmented Cobb-Douglas production function.
where:
Y is gross output or value added,
L j is the labor of the j th group, e.g. skilled and unskilled, e j is the effort function for the j th group of employees,
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Z is a vector of enterprise characteristics, e.g. ownership type, region, and year of observation, and is an identically and independently distributed disturbance term.
The effort function is defined as:
where B and η are parameters, W j is the observed wage of the j th group of employees, and W aj is the estimated spot-market competitive wage. This measure of the efficiency wage assumes that, if a worker loses his current job, the alternative wage would be the average predicted wage for his group. Wherever possible, we include in-kind benefits, particularly housing, in the wage measures we use.
Data for the the Urban Sample
The urban survey 4 is a stratified random sample, collected in the second half of 1992 for the year 1991, of urban enterprises within a randomly selected sample of locales.
This urban sample includes 442 enterprises in 24 cities of 12 provinces. Two survey instruments were administered, one to an official of each enterprise and the other to a random sample of employees of the enterprise. The sample size of the employee survey is 9397, which is about 1.5% of total employment. Enterprises come from all major types of ownership, state owned, collective, joint venture, and private. The sample contains almost the same number of enterprises from coastal areas as from non-coastal areas. See Tables 1 and 2 for more detailed information on this sample. The names of the provinces are listed at the bottom of Table 2 .
TABLES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE
The Rural Sample
The rural sample is a panel survey of 200 large rural, mostly township/village enterprises (TVEs) for the years 1984 to 1990. To the extent that economic reform originated in agriculture and progressed gradually over time, spreading geographically from rural to urban areas, the time gap between the urban and rural samples may not be too serious.
Nevertheless, differences in the empirical results should be interpreted in light of the temporal mismatch of the two samples. The survey covers 20 enterprises in each of 10 provinces. The survey includes not only data for the individual firms, but also important data describing the markets in which the firms operates, e.g., the total employment in the village where the firm is located. This allows us to test hypotheses on the impact of market structure on the behavior of the firm. 5 See Table 3 for sample statistics for this data set. If the employee lives in an employer-provided house, an estimated amount of annual market rent for the same size house in the same province is added to the wage income.
This estimated annual rent is based on the average annual rent per square meter paid by those who rent an apartment in the same province multiplied by the size of the house.
One of the anonymous referees suggests that, because of labor-market segmentation, the wage equation would be better specified if it included locational, e.g., provincial, dummy variables as in Gustafsson and Li (2000) . This is a debatable point. Huang, Hallam, Orazem, and Paterno (1998, p. 131) state that in their efficiency-wage paper, "The specification of the earnings function concentrates on human capital variables only. The intent is to estimate the wage premium as the portion of the wage uncorrelated with observable human capital." These authors do not include variables for union status, industry or geographical region in the wage equation from which their efficiency-wage estimates are generated. On the other hand, if labor markets in China are strictly segmented geographically, the relevant alternative wage in the efficiency-wage framework would be specific to the local or provincial labor-market. Indeed this is an implicit assumption in calculating the efficiency wage for the rural sample.
One could argue that urban workers are free to migrate to rural areas, e.g. back to
their communities of birth, should they lose their urban jobs, but rural workers are not so mobile. Thus, assuming an economy-wide alternative wage for workers in the urban sample is more defensible than it would be for workers in the rural sample. However, we have re-estimated the wage equation reported in Table 4 with locational dummy variables included as regressors. The estimated coefficients for high-school and college graduates fall from 0.084 to 0.049 and from 0.23 to 0.18, respectively, but both remain highly significant. Given the a priori considerations discussed above, we choose the formulation of the wage equation without locational dummies. Workers' rates of return to schooling are relatively low, as is uniformly found in studies of the Chinese economy, compared to both industrialized and other transition 13 economies. Table 4 .
9 Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients for the simplest specification of the production function, with both labor and the efficiency-wage variable pooled over both production and technical and administrative staff (TAS) workers. The output elasticity of labor, at 0.33, is estimated with considerable precision and, although low by comparison with estimates for most industrial economies, it is within the bounds of several studies of the Chinese economy, e.g., Chow (1994) , Dollar (1990) , and Fleisher, Dong, and Liu (1996) . However, the null of constant returns to scale is rejected, with a p-value of no greater than 1% (not reported).
A critical test of the joint hypothesis that enterprises are both profit-maximizing and pay efficiency wages is that the elasticity of work effort with respect to the efficiency wage is unity; see Solow (1979) and Stiglitz (1986) . By simple substitution of equation (2) into equation (1), we see that the elasticity of effort with respect to the efficiency wage can be identified easily by dividing the coefficient of the variable MT by the coefficient of ln L. If the effort-efficiency wage elasticity equals unity, the coefficient of the efficiencywage variable will equal that of the labor variable. This condition is clearly violated by the estimates reported in column (1). The calculated effort-efficiency wage elasticity in column (1) is more than 3, implying that the impact of paying an efficiency wage on profit is not being fully exploited. A similar result for wage bonus payments is reported by Zhuang and Xu (1996) and Dong and Putterman (2000) .
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The same calculations for the estimates reported in column (2) imply that there is grossly insufficient exploitation of the profit-maximizing potential of efficiency wages, more so by SOEs than by other ownership forms. 10 While SOEs are expected to be less profit-motivated than firms of other ownership forms, the other ownership classes apparently also fall far short of profit maximization with respect to the efficiency wage rate.
In column (3), we find that the implied effort-efficiency wage elasticity for production workers (the coefficient of MP W divided by the coefficient of P W ) is over 20. However, the output elasticity for production workers is insignificant and estimated quite imprecisely. The effort-efficiency wage elasticity for technical/administrative workers (the coefficent of MT AS divided by the coefficient of T AS) is about 1.4, which is rather close to the profit-maximizing value. Further calculations, using column (4), indicate that the effort-efficiency wage elasticity for technical/administrative workers is closest to profit-maximizing in joint-venture enterprises, which is reassuring, because of the likely degree of profit motivation in this ownership class. The calculation for TAS workers in joint-ventures is carried out using the estimated coefficient of the variables T AS TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE noncoastal province) and the efficiency-wage variable used to estimate equation (1). The dependent variable takes a value of 1 for enterprises reporting below-average shirking and 0 otherwise. We include the coastal-province dummy because these provinces contain favored locations that set them apart, geographically, politically, socially, and economically, from much of the rest of China (Démurger, Sachs, Woo, and Bao, 2001) . They have been the most productive, fastest growing, and wealthiest provinces, particularly since reform. We conjecture that effort and incentives are affected if workers live in favored locations and, therefore, we do not want to bias our results by excluding this variable from the estimated relationship. The results reported in Table 6 are not sensi-tive to the inclusion of the coastal-province dummy variable. The estimated coefficients are all highly significant, except that the coefficient of the efficiency-wage variable has a p-value of only 0.23. The pseudo-R 2 for the probit regression is approximately 0.5. The estimated coefficients of the ownership variables imply that shirking is most likely to be observed, or reported, among workers in SOEs than in the other ownership forms.
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Joint-venture enterprises are, on average, about 11% more likely to have below-average shirking than are SOEs. The comparable statistic for collectives is about 5% and for firms located in the coastal provinces, about 2%. An increase in the efficiency-wage variable of 1% is associated with a .016% decline in the probability that reported shirking is above average within ownership class groups, but this is a rather imprecise estimate, as indicated by the p-value of the corresponding coefficient in the probit equation. Table 7 presents the results of estimating equation (1) for the rural sample. The estimated production elasticities for aggregate labor and capital are close to the ordinary Pitt and Putterman (1999) and to the generalized least-squares (GLS) estimates reported by Dong and Putterman (1996) using the same data set. Compared to the results for the urban sample reported in Table 5 , there is evidence of unexploited scale economies. (Rejection of the null of constant returns and the important implications of increasing returns to scale for wages in rural collectives is discussed in Fleisher and Wang, 2001 .) The principal difference in the estimated individual production elasticities between rural and urban samples is that the labor elasticity estimated for the rural sample is over twice the magnitude as that reported for the urban sample. The relative magnitudes of the labor and capital elasticities are about the same as those reported by Pitt and Putterman (1999) .
The rural sample does not provide data on individual-worker schooling attainment.
Therefore, we have defined the efficiency wage for this sample to be the ratio of the deviation of the worker's actual wage to the average wage paid to that type of worker in the same province. The estimated coefficient of the efficiency-wage variable is highly significant, although smaller in magnitude than in the production functions estimated on the urban sample. Moreover, when the production function is estimated using the two categories of workers, their respective efficiency-wage coefficients are close in value to each other and of approximately equal statistical significance, which is in sharp contrast to the estimated coefficients for the urban sample. In contrast to the results for the urban sample, the ratio of the estimated efficiency-wage coefficients to their respective outputlabor elasticities is smaller than unity. This result holds for all workers taken together as well as for production and TAS workers separately in column (3). Notice that column (4) requires more complex calculations. Taken at face value, these coefficients suggests that wage rates are set higher than their profit-maximizing level based on an efficiencywage calculation. The sharp contrast between the too-low wage rates estimated for the urban sample and the too-high wage rates estimated for the rural sample constitutes a puzzle yet to be solved. The result is even more surprising if we note that the wage data in the urban sample are augmented to reflect housing payments in kind, whereas there is no information in the rural sample that permits this adjustment.
The panel nature of the rural sample permits us to explore the efficiency-wage hypothesis in more depth. The fundamental question is whether the estimated relationship between our efficiency-wage measures and output represents a genuine productivityenhancing effect or whether it reflects reverse causation in the form of bonus-sharing, as suggested by Coady and Wang (2000a) . Table 8 reports the results of Granger Causality tests of the hypothesis that the efficiency-wage measure TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE used in the estimates reported for the rural sample cause, in the sense of lead, productiv-ity growth. We define total factor productivity (TFP) in the usual way, as the residual from a regression of log output on log capital and log employment, in the form of equation (1), with the efficiency-wage variable omitted. The estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that the lagged efficiency-wage variable is a statistically significant predictor of TFP, whereas the estimates reported in columns (3) and (4) indicate that lagged TFP is not a statistically significant predictor of the efficiency-wage.
Therefore, the hypothesis that paying an efficiency wage leads to higher productivity in the rural sample sample cannot be rejected.
Conclusion and Agenda for Future Research
Consistent with previous research, we find evidence of productivity-enhancing wage effects in Chinese enterprises. However, much variation exists in the degree to which the profit-maximizing potential of incentive-wage payments is exploited for workers of different skill levels and by enterprises both in different ownership categories and in different regions. First, productivity is higher in firms that pay wage rates above the norm as measured by the average paid to all workers with similar characteristics. Second, evidence from panel data reinforces the causal relationship between profit-or rent sharing and productivity. Third, evidence from cross-section data indicates that shirking is less likely in enterprises that pay higher efficiency wages. Fourth, incentive wages do not appear to be set at profit-maximizing levels, although there is weak evidence that in the urban sample the productivity-enhancing potential of efficiency wages is more fully exploited by joint ventures and collectives than by SOEs and also by enterprises located in the coastal provinces compared with those in the interior.
In ongoing research, we hope to learn why efficiency wages appear to be lower in urban enterprises and higher in rural enterprises than would be warranted by simple profit maximization. We also hope to learn why incentive-wage effects appear to be more fully exploited for managerial-level workers in urban enterprises. The research reported in this paper describes enterprises' wage-setting behavior at the intensive margin, where the tradeoff is between higher wage costs and higher productivity per worker. In future research, we hope to reconcile these results with our understanding of enterprises' wage-employment choices at the extensive margin, where the tradeoff is between the marginal cost of employing additional workers and the value of labor's marginal product. Results from research in that area show that technical and administrative workers are consistently underpaid, or underemployed, relative to production workers, so that private returns to schooling are pervasively low (Fleisher and Wang, 2001 ). This remains one of the important unresolved puzzles of wage and employment behavior in 22 the Chinese economy. Notes: (i)Sample size is 422.
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(ii) Ownership classification and location are dummy variables. For example, the variable state has a mean of 0.40, which means that 40% of the surveyed firms are state-owned enterprises.
(iii) Coastal provinces in the sample are Hebei, Jiangsu, Shandong, Fujian, Guangdong, and Hainan. Non-coastal provinces Shanxi, Jilin, Anhui, Hunan, Henan and Sichuan. (ii) Standard deviations are in parentheses.
(iii) In this year only, the original price of fixed capital is used. Therefore, this year is not used in the estimations.
(iiv) The provinces in this sample are: Hebei, Guangdong, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Zhejiang (all defined as coastal), and Anhui, Hubei, Sichuan, Shanxi, and Gansu. (ii) Total sample size is 442. However, only 319 firms provided sufficient information on aggregated employment, while 262 provided sufficient information on disaggregated employment.
(iii) t-statistics are in parentheses.
(iv) Y is gross output.
(v) The efficiency wages are the residuals from the regression reported in Table 4 . (ii) The table is based on 9397 surveyed employees. 8238 employees provided sufficient information for the estimation. EW is the wage differential at the individual level and is different from M T in that the latter is simply the average of all interviewed employees in the same firm.
(iii) The estimated coefficients and standard errors are measured in probability units calculated at the means of the respective regressors. Calculations are available from the authors on request. (ii) t-statistics are in parentheses.
(iii) 1987 observations are dropped due to inadequate data. The maximum number of observations is 1200, but the discrepancies reflect missing values.
(iv) Y is value added.
(v) The efficiency wage is the ratio of the actual wage to the average wage paid to the group of workers in that province. 
Notes: (i) Dependent Variable: ln T F P (total factor productivity) for (1) and (2); ln EW (efficiency wage) for (3) and (4).
(ii) t-statistics are in parentheses for the top panel and p-values for the bottom panel.
(iii) ln T F P is the residual from the regression of log output on log capital and log employment.
(iiv) Efficiency wage is the ratio of actual wage and average wage paid to the same type of worker in the province. The paper has benefited significantly from the suggestions of two anonymous referees and the Editor.
2 We note that ex-post profit sharing may diminish work incentives through free riding if it is not accompanied by a perceived risk to workers of being forced to find less remunerative work in alternative employment should they be fired or laid off.
3 We emphasize that bonus schemes and profit sharing are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for workers to be paid more than they could earn in alternative employment. 5 We are grateful to Dennis Yang, Yaohui Zhao, Xiao-yuan Dong, Isabelle Perrigne, and Gary Jefferson for their help in obtaining and using these data.
6 Although the value of in-kind housing provided by employers is included in earnings, housing allocated by a spouse or a parent's employer is excluded. In addition, individual specific dummy variables such as location and occupation dummies are not included because they are most likely to be related to the efficiency wage itself; see Krueger and Summers (1988) .
7 Papers on China include Jamison and Van Der Gaag (1987) , Dessi (1991 ), Byron and Manaloto (1990 ), Fleisher, Dong, and Liu (1996 , Gregory and Xin (1995) , MaurerFazio (1999) , Maurer-Fazio, Rawski, and Zhang (1999) , Psacharopoulos (1985) , Wang, Zhu, and Stromsdorfer (1995) , Knight and Li (1996) , Li and Zhang (1998) , Zax (1994) , and Yang and An (forthcoming). Although returns to higher education in the Russian
Republic are among the lowest in the world, this can be attributed to the extraordinarily high proportion of college graduates, over 20% of all individuals aged 25 to 64 in 1995.
This percentage is nearly equal to that in the United States and higher than the average for OECD countries (Sheidvasser and Benítez-Silva, 2000) . 8 We experimented with alternate measures, including using provincial-level estimates of intermediate inputs. The resulting estimates are insensitive to these alternative specifications.
9 Re-estimation of equation (1) with residuals calculated from equation (2) that includes provincial dummy variables yields results quite similar to those reported in Table   5 .
10 The estimates reported in column (2) include interaction terms between the efficiencywage variable and ownership-class dummies for collectives and joint ventures, so that SOEs occupy the residual ownership category.
11 The numbers are (1.21 − 0.43)/0.47 and 1.21/0.47, respectively.
12 The exact question is as follows:
"Sometimes, some workers employed in your enterprise might not work every hard, but they are not in obvious violations of the enterprise's work rules. How often does this problem arise in your enterprise?
1. Very often; 2. Average; 3. Infrequent."
For simplicity, the first two answers are grouped as 0 while answer 3 is treated as 1 in the probit estimation. For 9397 respondents, 22.7% chose answer 1, 36.5% chose answer 38 2, 31.2% chose answer 3, and 9.6% did not answer the question.
13 SOEs are represented by the omitted dummy variable and thus their estimated effect is less than for the other ownership forms.
14 Re-estimation of the shirking probit equation by including residuals calculated from equation (2) with provincial dummy variables included yields results that differ little from those reported in Table 6 .
